

3 Derailing Rebellion: Inventing White Privilege

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Constructing Race

Improbable as it now seems, since Americans live in a society where racial characterization and self-definition appear to be parts of nature, in the early days of colonization before slavery was solidified and clearly distinguished from other forms of forced labor, Europeans and Africans seem not to have seen their physical differences in that way.¹ It took until the end of the 1700s for ideas about race to develop until they resembled those we live with today. Before Bacon's Rebellion, African and European indentured servants made love with each other, married each other, ran away with each other, lived as neighbors, liked or disliked each other according to individual personality. Sometimes they died or were punished together for resisting or revolting. And masters had to free both

Europeans and Africans if they survived to the end of their indentures. Likewise, Europeans initially did not place all Native Americans in a single racial category. They saw cultural, not biological, differences among Native Americans as distinguishing one tribe from another and from themselves.

Given the tendency of slaves, servants, and landless free Europeans and Africans to cooperate in rebellion, the elite had to "teach Whites the value of whiteness" in order to divide and rule their labor force.² After Bacon's Rebellion they utilized their domination of colonial legislatures that made laws and of courts that administered them, gradually building a racial strategy based on the earlier tightening and lengthening of African indenture. Part of this process was tighter control of voting. Free property-owning blacks, mulattos, and Native Americans, all identified as *not* of European ancestry, were denied the vote in 1723.³

To keep the racial categories separate, a 1691 law increased the punishment of European women who married African or Indian men; toward the end of the 1600s a white woman could be whipped or enslaved for marrying a black. Eventually enslavement for white women was abolished because it transgressed the definition of slavery as black. The problem of what to do with white women's "black" children was eventually partially solved by the control of white women's reproduction to prevent the existence of such children. The potentially "white" children of black women were

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defined out of existence; they were “black” and shifted from serving a thirty-year indenture to being slaves. To facilitate these reproductive distinctions and to discourage the intimacy that can lead to solidarity and revolts, laws were passed requiring separate quarters for black and white laborers. Kathleen Brown points out that the control of women’s bodies thus became critical to the maintenance of whiteness and to the production of slaves.⁴ At the same time black men were denied the rights of colonial masculinity as property ownership, guns, and access to white women were forbidden. Children were made to inherit their mother’s status, freeing European fathers from any vestiges of responsibility for their offspring born to indentured or enslaved African mothers. This legal shift has had a profound effect on the distribution of wealth in the United States ever since; slaveholding fathers were some of the richest men in the country, and their wealth, distributed among *all* their children, would have created a significant wealthy black segment of the population.

At the same time a changing panoply of specific laws molded European behavior into patterns that made slave revolt and cross-race unity more and more difficult.⁵ These laws limited, for instance, the European right to teach slaves to read. Europeans couldn’t use slaves in skilled jobs, which were reserved for Europeans. Europeans had to administer prescribed punishment for slave “misbehavior” and were expected to participate in patrolling at night. They did not have the legal right to befriend blacks. A white

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servant who ran away with a black was subject to additional punishment beyond that for simply running away. European rights to free their slaves were also curtailed.

Built into all this, rarely mentioned but nevertheless basic to the elite’s ability to create and maintain whiteness, slavery, and exploitation, was the use of force against both blacks and whites. Fear kept many whites from challenging, or even questioning, the system. It is worth quoting Lerone Bennett’s analysis of how the differentiation between black and white was accomplished:

The whole system of separation and subordination rested on official state terror. The exigencies of the situation required men to kill some white people to keep them white and to kill many blacks to keep them black. In the North and South, men and women were maimed, tortured, and murdered in a comprehensive campaign of mass conditioning. The severed heads of black and white rebels were impaled on poles along the road as warnings to black people and white people, and opponents of the status quo were starved to death in chains and roasted slowly over open fires. Some rebels were branded; others were castrated. This exemplary cruelty, which was carried out as a deliberate process of mass education, was an inherent part of the new system.⁶

Creating White Privilege

White privileges were established. The “daily exercise of white personal power over black individuals had become a cherished aspect of Southern culture,” a critically important part of getting whites to “settle for being white.”⁷ Privilege encouraged whites to identify with the big slaveholding planters as members of the same

“race.” They were led to act on the belief that all whites had an equal interest in the maintenance of whiteness and white privilege, and that it was the elite—those controlling the economic system, the political system, and the judicial system—who ultimately protected the benefits of being white.⁸

More pain could be inflicted on blacks than on whites.² Whites alone could bear arms; whites alone had the right of self-defense. White servants could own livestock; Africans couldn't. It became illegal to whip naked whites. Whites but not Africans had to be given their freedom dues at the end of their indenture. Whites were given the right to beat any blacks, even those they didn't own, for failing to show proper respect. Only whites could be hired to force black labor as overseers. White servants and laborers were given lighter tasks and a monopoly, for a time, on skilled jobs. White men were given the right to control “their” women without elite interference; blacks as slaves were denied the right to family at all, since family would mean that slave husbands, not owners, controlled slave wives. In 1668, all free African women were defined as labor, for whom husbands or employers had to pay a tithe, while white women were defined as keepers of men's homes, not as labor; their husbands paid no tax on them. White women were indirectly given control of black slaves and the right to substitute slave labor for their own labor in the fields.

Despite these privileges, landless whites, some of them living in “miserable huts,” might have rejected white privilege if they saw that

in fact it made little *positive* difference in their lives, and instead merely protected them from the worst *negative* effects of elite punishment and interference, such as were inflicted on those of African descent.¹⁰ After all, the right to whip someone doesn't cure your own hunger or landlessness. By the end of the Revolutionary War unrest was in the air. Direct control by the elite was no longer politically or militarily feasible. Rebellions and attempted rebellions had been fairly frequent in the hundred years following Bacon's Rebellion.¹¹ They indicated the continuing depth of landless European discontent. Baptist ferment against the belief in the inherent superiority of the upper classes simply underscored the danger.¹²

So landless Europeans had to be given some *material* reason to reject those aspects of their lives that made them similar to landless Africans and Native Americans, and to focus instead on their similarity to the landed Europeans—to accept whiteness as their defining characteristic. Landless Europeans' only real similarity to the elite was their European ancestry itself, so that ancestry had to be given real significance: European ancestry was identified with upward mobility and the right to use the labor of the non-eligible in their upward climb. So, since land at that time was the source of upward mobility, land had to be made available, if only to a few.

Meanwhile, Thomas Jefferson advocated the establishment of a solid white Anglo-Saxon yeoman class of small farmers, who, as property

owners, would acquire a vested interest in law and order and reject class conflict with the elite. These small farmers would, by upholding "law and order," support and sometimes administer the legal mechanisms—jails, workhouses and poorhouses, and vagrancy laws—that would control other whites who would remain a landless labor force. They would support the legal and illegal mechanisms controlling Native Americans, Africans, and poor whites, becoming a buffer class between the elite and those they most exploited, disguising the elite's continuing grip on power and wealth....

The Psychological Wage

The initial construction of whiteness had been based on a material benefit for whites: land, or the apparently realistic hope of land. By the 1830s and 1840s, most families identified by their European descent had had several generations of believing their whiteness was real. But its material benefit had faded. Many whites were poor, selling their labor either as farm renters or as industrial workers, and they feared wage slavery, no longer certain they were much freer than slaves.¹³ But this time, to control unrest, the elite had no material benefits they were willing to part with. Nor were employers willing to raise wages. Instead, politicians and elites emphasized whiteness as a benefit in itself.

The work of particular white intellectuals, who underscored the already existing belief in white superiority and the worries about white slavery, was funded by elites and published in elite-owned

printing houses.¹⁴ These intellectuals provided fodder for newspaper discussions, speeches, scientific analysis, novels, sermons, songs, and blackface minstrel shows in which white superiority was phrased as if whiteness in and of itself was naturally a benefit, despite its lack of material advantage. This sense of superiority allowed struggling northern whites to look down their noses at free blacks and at recent immigrants, particularly the Irish. This version of whiteness was supposed to make up for their otherwise difficult situation, providing them with a "psychological wage" instead of cash—a bit like being employee of the month and given a special parking place instead of a raise.

Many whites bought into the psychological wage, expressing their superiority over non-whites and defining them, rather than the capitalists, as the enemy. They focused, often with trade union help, on excluding blacks and immigrants from skilled trades and better-paying jobs. Employers cooperated in confining blacks and immigrants to manual labor and domestic work, making a clear definition of the work suitable for white men.¹⁵ Native white men began shifting away from defining themselves by their landowning freedom and independence. Instead they accepted their dependence on capitalists and the control employers exercised over their lives, and began to define themselves by their class position as skilled "mechanics" working for better wages under better working conditions than other people. They became proud of their productivity, which grew with the growing efficiency of industrial technology, and began using it to define whiteness—and manhood.

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The ethic of individual hard work gained far wider currency. Successful competition in the labor marketplace gradually became a mark of manhood, and “white man’s work” became the defining characteristic of whiteness.¹⁶ Freedom was equated with the right to own and sell your own labor, as opposed to slavery, which allowed neither right. Independence was now defined not only by property ownership but also by possession of skill and tools that allowed wage-earning men to acquire status as a head of household controlling dependents.¹⁷

This redefinition of whiteness was built as much on changing gender as on changing class relationships.¹⁸ Many native white men and women, including workers, journalists, scientists, and politicians, began discouraging married women from working for wages, claiming that true women served only their own families. Despite this claim—the cult of domesticity, or of true womanhood—many wives of working class men actually did work outside the home. They were less likely to do so in those cases where native men were able, through strikes and the exclusion of women, immigrants, and free blacks, to create an artificial labor shortage. Such shortages gave native working class men the leverage to force employers to pay them enough to afford a non-earning wife. Women in the families of such men frequently did “stay home” and frequently helped to promote the idea that people who couldn’t do the same were genetically or racially or culturally inferior.

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But native whites whose wages actually weren’t sufficient struggled on in poverty. If a native woman worked for wages, particularly in a factory, the family lost status. Many female factory workers were now immigrants rather than native whites. Many had no husband or had husbands whose wages, when they could get work, came nowhere near supporting a family.¹⁹ It is no wonder immigrant women weren’t particularly “domestic.” Such families didn’t meet the cultural requirements for white privilege—male “productivity” in “white man’s work” and dependent female “domesticity.” These supposed white virtues became a bludgeon with which to defend white privilege and to deny it to not-quite-whites and not-whites, helping to construct a new working class hierarchy. This new hierarchy reserved managerial and skilled jobs for “productive” native whites. So, for the price of reserving better jobs for some native whites, the capitalist class gained native white consent to their own loss of independence and to keeping most of the working class on abysmally low wages.

In the South, where there was less industry, the psychological wage slowly developed an additional role. It was used not only to gain consent to oppressive industrial relations, but also to convince poor farming whites to support Southern elites in their conflict with Northern elites. Du Bois points out that by the Civil War

... it became the fashion to pat the disenfranchised poor white man on the back and tell him after all he was white and that he and the planters had a common object in keeping the white man superior. This virus increased bitterness and relentless

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hatred, and after the war it became a chief ingredient in the division of the working class in the Southern States.²⁰

Notes

1. My discussion of the construction of race and racial slavery is deeply indebted to Lerone Bennett, *The Shaping of Black America* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993 [1975]), 1–109. See also Theodore Allen, *Invention of the White Race*, vol. II, *The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America* (New York: Verso, 1997), 75–109; Audrey Smedley, *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of Worldview* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 100–1, 109, 142–3, 198; Kathleen Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 107–244; bell hooks, *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston: South End Press, 1981), 15–51.
2. Bennett, *Shaping of Black America*, 74–5.
3. Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 241.
4. Brown, *Good Wives*, pays particular attention to control of women's bodies and status in producing slavery and race (see especially 181, 129–33, 116); also see Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 128–35, 146–7, 177–88; Bennett, *Shaping of Black America*, 75.
5. For this section, see Bennett, *Shaping of Black America*, 72; Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1975), 311–3; Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 249–53.
6. Bennett, *Shaping of Black America*, 73–4.
7. The first quote is from Smedley, *Race in North America*, 224; the second is from David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991), 6.
8. Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 162, 248–53, emphasizes that elites invented white supremacy to protect their own interests, although working-class whites did much of the “dirty work” of oppression.

9. Morgan, *American Slavery*, 312–3. On white privileges, see Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 67–8; Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 250–3; Brown, *Good Wives*, 180–3.

10. The quote is from Allen, *Invention*, vol. II, 256, citing a contemporary traveler.

11. Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995, 2nd ed.), 58.

12. Smedley, *Race in North America*, 174–5.

13. See David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991), 13–4, 65–87, for a discussion of white attitudes toward “wage slavery” and “white slavery.”

14. For discussion of elite manipulation of attitudes, see particularly Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Verso, 1990); Smedley, *Race in North America*; Allen, *Invention of the White Race*, vol. I, 163–5.

15. Allen, *Invention*, vol. I, 192–9. Critiques the common assumption that the focus on “job competition” was natural as opposed to manipulated by elites.

16. Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 112, 115; Allen, *Invention*, vol. I, 195. On “Marketplace Man,” see Michael Kimmel, “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity,” in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman, eds., *Theorizing Masculinities* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 123; Jonathan Edmonds, “Meat vs Rice: Euro-American Labor and Feminization of the Chinese American Working Class” (term paper, Seminar on Chinese American Labor, Oberlin College, 1997).

17. On independence and labor as a free man's own property, see Lacy Ford, “Frontier Democracy: The Turner Thesis Revisited,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 13 (1993), 158–9; McCurry, “The Politics of the Yeoman Households in South Carolina”; Smedley, *Race in North America*, 47–8; Hahn, “The Yeomanry of the Nonplantation South,” 33.

18. For issues raised in this section, see Karen Brodwin, *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 77–102; Julie Matthaei, *An Economic History of Women in America: Women's Work, the Sexual Division of Labor, and the Development of Capitalism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1982), 124–40; Alice Abel Kemp, *Women's Work: Degraded and Devalued* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994), 149–59.

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19. Leith Mullings, "Uneven Development: Class, Race, and Gender in the United States before 1900," in Eleanor Leacock and Helen Safa, eds., *Women's Work: Development and the Division of Labor by Gender* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1986), 50-1.

20. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 80.